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Abstract: 
 
In this paper we argue that, Modern Greek Tragedy is mainly due to the overvalued euro in 
combination with the strict austerity policies imposed by Berlin. Greece also pays the price 
of the currency war between the dollar and the euro. The latter puts a heavy burden upon the 
country’s economic competitiveness as a costume that does not fit the Greek economy, which 
is mainly based on tourism that requires a labour-intensive production process.  
 
The deadlocks of strict monetary and income’s policies,  accelerates the upcoming economic 
thunderstorm, the spiral of recession, the increase in unemployment, the brutal reduction of 
wages and pensions, the further fall of GDP and the increase of the debt. The always 
renewed fatal economic forecasts, simply postpone the explosion of the deadlock. Basic 
economics in theory and in practice are being depreciated.  
 
One wonders if there are economists, neoliberals, not to mention, Keynesians and/or radicals 
that, may support the possibility of an economic recovery under deep recession policies and 
the existence of a hard currency such as the euro. Trapped under the Berlin’s political prison 
and the euro zone fetish, Greece continues to follow its tragic road on the grounds that there 
is no alternative. Yet, in democracies there are no dead ends. If an economic policy is proven 
to be wrong and catastrophic, the best alternative is to change it. 
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1. Currency Wars and Consequences for Greece 
 
The Canadian economist Robert Mundell won a Nobel Prize in 1999 for his analysis 
on monetary and fiscal policies under different schemes of exchange rates, 
associated with the issue of optimal currency areas (Mundel, 1961). He is considered 
the father of the euro, since he designed it and was strongly in favor of its creation. 
Clearly though, he did not anticipate the distortion that was caused by the 
establishment of a common currency in countries with distinct economic structure, 
without having a central balancing economic and political umbrella. Many, if not the 
majority of internationally leading economists, seem to share the same views on the 
adverse operation of the euro zone
1
. Besides theoretical opinions, the euro zone 
countries, primarily Greece, followed by the other peripheral countries, are lacking 
substantially with regard to their growing potential compared to the rest of the 
world. 
 
Berlin, contrary to Washington and the IMF, maintains a strict enforcement of the 
Eurozone's rules and of harsh policies leading to further recession; it wishes to create 
a small strong core of countries using the euro, which will compete with the dollar 
and replace it as exchange currency in international transactions. This little-known 
“currency war” between the dollar and the euro appears to account for Berlin's 
fixation on keeping a high euro exchange rate. Berlin wants Greece to leave the euro 
zone. The latter, due to its enormous debts as well as because of its different 
                                                          
1 Among the worldwide leading economists, economic analysts, University professors who 
share more a less similar views are the following: 
Paul Krugman (Nombel prize), Josef Stiglitz (Nombel prize), Hans Werner Sinn (iFo, Institut
e of Economic Research), Kenneth Rogoff (Harvard), Noam Chomski 
(MIT), Simon Johnson (MIT), Martin Felstein (Harvard), John Hekman (FTI, Harvard,MIT),
 Nurel Rubini (Global Economics), Marcello de Cecco (Parma University, 
Italy), Jayati Ghosh,(Nehru University, India), Ross McLeod (National Australian University
), Otmar Ising (economist, European Central Bank), Zoao Ferreira do Amaral (University of
 Lisbon, Portugal), Alexander Dilger (university of Munster), Alain Parguez (Université de 
Franche) Joachim Starbatty (University of Koln|), Helmut Schlesinger (ex President 
Budesbang), Naomi Klein (writer, USA), Michael Fooks (economic analyst), Stefan 
Xompourg (ex Bundesatag), Nouriel John Weeks (SOAS, London University), Simon Wren-
Lewis (Oxford University), Lothar Mayer (University of 
Harbourg), Simon Drake and George Friedman (Statforr Institute), Jürgen Kaizer (economic 
analyst, USA), Lisa Mittendrein (Attac, Austria), Alan Sked (L.S.E., England), Dirk Muller 
(economic analyst, writer, Berlin), Lucke (University of Humburg) Mark Roche (economic 
analyst), François Asselineau  (UPR, France), Opa Kapijimpanga (AFRODAD), Francisco 
La Manna (Italian economist), Bernd, Gerd Robanus (economist, AfD), Dean Beaton 
(CEPR), Amol Rajan (The Independent), Konrad Adam (economic analyst, 
AfD), Johan Van Overtveldt, (economist, writer), Zack Sapir (economic analyst, France), 
Greg Palast (economic analyst, 
Observer), George Freedman (Statfort Institute), Rotzer Bootle (economist,Wolfson prize, G. 
Briain) etc. 
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economic structure, is unable to follow the strict euro zone rules. If Berlin accepts to 
loosen euro zone rules for Greece, then this will have a domino effect on the other 
Southern countries as well and the euro will lose the war. "If you want to keep the 
euro at any cost, you will have to pay that cost" is what they tell us.  
 
On the contrary, Washington with the support of France, while needs Germany to 
remain strong and function as a bulwark against the Russian bear, does not want it to 
become powerful enough to be able to question the US leadership in the western 
world and the global economy ( Muler, 2013). Furthermore, the US does not accept 
the replacement of the dollar with the euro, as an exchange and reserve currency for 
international transactions. Unfortunately, the Greek governments backed by the 
county’s economic and media elit, have chosen to place Greece under the 
"protection" of Washington. So, the USA insists on maintaining a rather loose euro 
zone, which is further facilitated by the week Greek hoop in euro zone chain. 
 
As James Rickards writes in his revealing book Currency Wars
,
 “today we are going 
through a new currency war, whose consequences are much worse than the issues 
arisen from the enforcement of the gold standard. In this war, countries steal the 
development potential of other countries through the devaluation of their 
currencies” (Richards, 2014). This is exactly the case in Greece, where the high 
exchange rate of the euro along with other factors, such as huge discrepancies in 
taxation, lending, interests, etc. destroy the international competitiveness of the 
Greek economy. 
 
2. The Negative Effects of the Euro to the Greek Economy 
 
The overvalued euro mainly favors the countries that create high technology and 
innovation products. For instance, when a product such as a new effective medicine 
safeguards its patent and cannot be copied for at least 20 years, its production cost 
may be trivial, but its sale price is extremely high. This allows for an absurd profit 
margin, since the labor and raw materials cost is significantly low. A modern 
magnetic resonance tomograph, for example one made by Siemens, is so expensive 
because its purchase is considered necessary in global markets. Its spare parts are 
also sold at an extremely high price, although their cost is almost nothing. In 
addition, Siemens, as well as other multinational corporations, are keeping a “well 
paid” network of buyers worldwide.  
 
This is the reason why the hard, overvalued euro benefits countries that focus on 
technology and innovation such as Germany. So, the latter profits excessively 
through the highly expensive exports of technological products; zero or negative 
interest rates of bonds and deposits that collectively gathers from countries all 
around the world, since it is regarded as a safe investment destination. Conversely, 
Greece, even though it has an immense human scientific potential a large part of 
which has emigrated abroad, maintains as its main production orientation tourism 
and agriculture, which require a labor intensive production process. Therefore, a 
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significant amount of workforce is needed but unable to reduce its cost below a 
certain point, so as the total production cost to be lower or equal to that of our 
competitors. The charge for a hotel room in Greece, due to the high exchange rate of 
the euro compared to other currencies, is almost double than in Turkey, Egypt, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary etc. 
 
Because of the hard, expensive euro, combined with the Common Agricultural 
Policy of the EU and the adverse effects of subsidies, Greek agricultural production, 
with a labor cost that reaches 70 – 80% of the total production cost, goes to waste. 
Oranges, lemons, cherries, olives fall from the trees and rot, as importing from 
Argentina, Morocco, Egypt, etc. is cheaper. Even the lowest-paid workers in the 
agriculture field, Greeks or immigrants, cost far more, since they get paid in euro, 
than workers in some other countries who get paid in a devaluated currency. If farm 
workers in Greece cost 25 euro minimum, in Turkey, where they get paid in Turkish 
liras, their cost is estimated at 10-15 euro approximately. Cost of life in the neighbor 
country is also lower due to the devaluated Turkish lira and the majority of 
consumer products bought by a Turkish employee are cheaper. In other words, the 
purchasing power of 20 euro in Greece corresponds to 10-12 euro in Turkey or 
Bulgaria (Katsanevas, 2016). 
 
The fact that Bulgaria belongs to the EU but not to the Eurozone having its own 
devaluated currency, has led thousands of Greek companies to transfer their 
registered office there. This is further exacerbated by burdens from direct and 
indirect taxation for companies and private parties, which in Bulgaria are about half 
the amount compared to that in Greece. Greek truck drivers are replaced by 
Bulgarians, since the cost of life there is much lower and therefore, they receive a 
much lower compensation. Greek pensioners are moving to Bulgaria because their 
extremely low pension in euro has an increased purchasing power there. Numerous 
Greek consumers who reside near the borders with Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria and 
Turkey, go on one-day trips to these countries to buy low-cost products of any kind. 
 
3. The Impact of International Currency Exchange Rates 
 
In general, the international exchange rates are regulated in the basis of international 
trade agreements under the World Trade Organization and on the supply and 
demand of imported and exported goods and services. In reality though, trade 
agreements have dissipated and the policies followed by the central banks of various 
countries have now an essential role. The banks, employing several means and 
specifically supplying or withdrawing exchange currency, granting direct or indirect 
subsidies for exports, posing obstacles to imports and regulating interest rates, set 
currency exchange rates that are advantageous for their countries.  
 
A typical example is China, which by keeping the yuan exchange rate at extremely 
low prices,despite western complaints  and requests  for change of policy, has burst 
forth in global markets and today its foreign - exchange reserves exceed 4 trillion 
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dollars. The devaluation of the Chinese stock exchange market in the late 
2015,actually reflects the strategy followed by the Chinese government, concerning 
the downward drift of yuan, in order to support its exports. China is less interested in 
this than in promoting its exports. Apart from the enormous economic and political 
size of the country, Chinese banks are controlled by the state and it is impossible for 
any cunning Goldman Sachs or international vulture funds to speculate on the yuan.   
 
As Simon Johnson points out, “the underlying problem in the euro area is the 
exchange rate system itself – the fact that these European countries locked 
themselves into an initial exchange rate, i.e., the relative price of their currencies, 
and promised never to change that exchange rate. This amounted to a very big bet 
that their economies would converge in productivity – that the Greeks (and others in 
what we now call the “periphery”) would, in effect, become more like the 
Germans”(Jonshon, S., 2015) 
 
Histogram 1. Germany’s trade surplus vs Greece before and after the euro 
launch
 
Source: OECD 
 
In fact, the gap between German and Greek (and other peripheral countries) 
productivity increased, rather than decreased, over the last decade. Germany, as a 
result, developed a large surplus on its current account – meaning that it exports 
more than it imports. Without doubt, Germany vs Greece was the big winner of the 
euro zone creation as it is clearly shown in above Histogram 1 and not only. 
 
During the initial euro zone years, countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland, had large current account deficits; they were buying more from abroad than 
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they were selling abroad. Their deficits were financed by capital inflows, including 
mainly from Germany. In theory, these capital inflows could have helped peripheral 
Europe invest, become more productive and “catch up” with Germany. In practice, 
the capital inflows, in the form of borrowing, created the pathologies that now roil 
European markets.  
 
As Engelbert (2011) states, “the Greek debt crisis is often presented as a result of 
lack of fiscal discipline. There is some obvious truth in this as Greek deficits were 
higher than those of other Euro area countries. On the other hand, the fact that 
other peripheral countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain) are experiencing 
similar crises suggesting that a more general mechanism is at work. Indeed, we will 
argue, German export surpluses are a critical part of the story.   
 
Histograme 2. Evolution of Greek GDP in relation to other euro zone countries 
 
 
 
 
4. The Gigantic Leap of the Greek Debt within the Eurozone   
 
A brief overview of official statistical data reveals the collapse of Greek economy 
within the euro zone
2
. Following a period of fabricated prosperity during 2002-2007 
                                                          
2
 Present data is drown from Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT), Manpower 
Employment Organization (OAED), Bank of Greece and  Eurostat. 
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which was systematically promoted through the increase of public debt and soaring 
escalation of lending to credit institutions, Greece faces eight years of economic 
decline from 2008 until today. There is no such precedent in modern economic 
world history, since even the great depression of 1929-32 in the US did not last more 
than six years (Histograms 2 and 3). In particular since 2008, public debt continues 
to rise whereas the national income deeply decreases without hope of recovery.  
 
All economy indexes are collapsing. During the euro zone period, an enormous army 
of unemployed people was created, the largest percentage in Europe (Histogram 4). 
Employed people in 2002 were 4.353 million while in the end of 2015 they were 
decreased to 3.65 million. The unemployment percentage has more than doubled 
during 2002-2015; from 10-11%, it has reached 24-26% in general population and 
over 40% in young adults. As a result, more than 500,000 young Greeks have 
immigrated abroad over the past six years.( ELSTAT Report, Sept.2016) Thousands 
of businesses are shutting or moving to other countries, such as Bulgaria, Cyprus,  
Great Britain, Switzerland, etc. in search of better tax and business conditions. 
According to Eurostat, between 2008-2015, 244.000 enterprises where shut down 
and 842.000 work places where lost. 
 
Histogram 3. A comparison between current Greek depression and 1929 Great 
Depression 
 
 
 
Source: The Pen World Tables 
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The Histogram 5 disproves the popular myth that today's huge debt of Greece has 
been inherited from the past. As it is shown in the same Histogram which presents 
official data of the Eurostat, during the 1980s and the 1970s, the debt constituted an 
amount below 50% of the GDP. In late 1980s it increased to 60% and reached 75% 
in the mid 1990s and approximately 100% towards the end of that decade. It was 
within the euro zone though, that the debt took a quantum leap and reached 180% 
after 2008 and today it amounts well 200% of GDP in accordance with the National 
Debt Org in May 2016.  
 
Within the euro zone, the debt continued to increase and it will continue to do so, 
regardless of the recapitalization or the haircut (PSI) in 2012, by fleecing bonds of 
the Greek state and Greek citizens, seizing Greek banks in 2014 and 2015, arbitrarily 
selling out public property in 2016, the larcenous shrinkage of incomes through 
taxation and the decrease in pensions and wages. Since 2002, when Greece entered 
the euro zone and granted the right of currency issuance to the European Central 
Bank in Frankfurt, it lost its sovereignty and it turns again and again to the lenders 
for new loans in order to pay up the older ones. It is an endless spiraling of loans that 
are self-perpetuated through principal and interest debt repayment. 
  
Histogram 4. Unemployment rates in European countries 
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Histogram 5. Evolution of Greek debt as a percentage of the GDP 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The data referring to the annual payment of principal and interest debt to the lenders 
have not been officially disclosed. Yet, they can be estimated based on various 
statements occasionally given by foreign and Greek competent officials, which are 
rarely presented in the Greek media for obvious reasons. In April 2016, the 
Bloomberg Agency published a staggering histogram which   shows that, within 
2016, Greece must pay a total of 19 billion euro (Histogram 6). As it is also 
illustrated in the same histogram, the largest part of the payments has to be deposited 
during June and July 2016, when Greece has paid up 11 billion euro to the lenders. 
         
In the Eurogroup summit of 23 May 2016, it was agreed that, the annual loan 
payments must be even higher: 15% of the GDP initially (25-26 billion euro) and 
20% of the GDP (34-35 billion euro) latter on. Unofficial sources stated that, the 
whole matter will be discussed after the German elections of 2018, when the Greek 
heavy loans might be partly cut and extended in time. In any case, even though the 
Greek balance of payments currently has no more deficits as in the past, such huge 
loan liabilities as agreed in the Eurogroup summit are obviously impossible to be 
met by an economy which is in a free fall state.  
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Histogram 6. Monthly evolution of loan liabilities for the repayment of the Greek 
debt 
 
 
 
Source : Bloomberg  
 
Since this is out of discussion, it appears that the lender’ s plan B is to acquire, the 
larger  part of such funds by the establishment of the “Superfund” under their 
command, where all state property of the country is to be included for 99 years and 
thus transforming the country to a modern “Banana Republic”3. In any case, the loss 
of funds from public property transformed to “Superfund” will deprive the Greek 
state budget from the influx of precious income and thus, new budget deficits will 
arise. Moreover, the ever more extreme austerity measures policies imposed by the 
lenders, will lead to further shrinkage of the economic cycle and deeper recession.   
It is an undeniable truth that Greece’s colossal debt, which is increasingly growing, 
is not sustainable; a fact that is understood even by first year students of economics.  
This recession spiraling is irreversible and not any illusion of fake optimism can 
reverse it. Insofar the country is completely controlled by the distorted euro zone 
with the overvalued euro and harsh recession policy enforced, along with the disease 
of the fierce modern stock market capital; there is no possibility for the Greek 
economy to recover from the coma of destruction that has been trapped in. The 
considerably heavy debt of Greece, which is continuously growing, is completely 
                                                          
3
 The “Superfund” named “Greek Company of Partnership and Estate” basically controlled 
by the lenders, acquires for 99 years all state property such as ports, air ports, state land 
,buildings, hotels touristic  real estate, state companies of electricity, petroleum ,gas, water, 
civil transport,  railways etc. 
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unfeasible to be paid up. This resembles less to reality and more to a science fiction 
scenario. It is hard to believe that the economic downhill of the Greek economy, can 
miraculously be averted. To put it simply, no such miracles can happen. The “Deus 
ex machina” common in ancient Greek theatre is not common to day. 
 
5. Most of the Loan Payments to Greece go to European Banks 
  
In accordance with Eurostat, the Greek public debt, was 317 billion euro (177.1 % of 
the GDP) in 2014, 320 billion euro (180.2% of the GDP) in 2015 and is expected to 
be 319.6 billion Euros (173.4% of the GDP) in 2016 (Table 4) 
4
. In May 2016, the 
European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)  based in Berlin, 
published a research report providing a descriptive analysis of where the Greek 
bailout money went since 2010( ESMT, May 2016).  In accordance with the same 
study, out of the 220 billion Euros disbursed to Greece since the beginning of 
the economic crisis  about 95% ( 210,3 billion euro ) have gone mainly to German 
and French and less than 5% (9.7 billion euro) went into the state budget for the 
benefit of Greek citizens. More analytically and in accordance with the same study, 
(also published in the German Handelsblatt newspaper in 5,May 2016), apart from 
the above sum of 9,7 billion, 86.9 billion Euros (46,67%) of the bailout money went 
to repay old debts, 52.3 billion Euros (28,08) for payment of interest, and 37.3 
billion euro 20,03%) for the recapitalization of Greek Banks.  
 
In the latter case, this was necessary because of the large escape of capital abroad-a 
fact also related to the malfunction of the euro zone.  (Pies 1 and 2). These findings 
where assumed and discussed but few knew as a fact, but now they are confirmed by 
the above valid study.  
 
As stated in the same study, “for six years there are attempts to stop the Greek crisis 
with tougher measures and loans that require new loans to pay back the older ones. 
The cause of the failure is less in the side of the Greek government and more in the 
design of assistance programs. These calculations are raising doubts about the 
proper design of assistance programs, since the loans serviced debts, although 
Greece is the 2010 de facto bankrupt. In particular, the salvation of Greek banks 
proved disastrous for taxpayers. Overall, they channelled 37.3 billion euro in Greek 
banks from the two aid packages. But the aid is fully diminished. After the 
recapitalization by the PSI of 2012 the banks have lost almost 98% of their value in 
the stock market. Moreover, the resulting risk transfer from the private to the public 
sector and the subsequent risk transfer within the public sector from international 
organizations such as the ECB and the IMF to European rescue mechanisms such as 
                                                          
4
 According to the National Debt Clocks.Org, in May 2016,  the Greek debt amounts to 344,5 
billion euro and 210% of GDP. In accordance with the same source and in contrast with the 
official data of the Eurostat, the Greek GDP has fallen to 164 billion euro in the early 2016. 
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the ESM, still constitute the most important challenge for the goal to achieve a 
sustainable fiscal situation in Greece”. 5 
 
Pie 1. ESMT estimations about the distribution of the 186,2 billion euro loans to 
Greece 
 
 
 
Source: European School of Management and Technology, Berlin 
 
6. State Budget and Balance of Payments 
 
Over the last two years, the Greek state budget appears in balance or with a very 
minor surplus. The IMF, contrary to the Eurostat  insists that, the small surplus of 
the Greek deficit is not real, mainly due to state debts to suppliers, pensioners etc. 
Nevertheless, it is a fact that the state budget balance has been improved and at least 
it does not show high deficits as it did in the past. Similarly, the country’s balance of 
payments is also in surplus or more or less balanced. The government takes pride in 
                                                          
5
 The ex Prime Minister of Italy, Massimo D’ Alema in a revealing interview to Skype in 
6/8/2015 pointed out that “. €220bn out of the €250bn of aid to Greece has gone directly to 
the German, French and Italian banks, as interest paid to the lenders. In reality, when we 
say that we’re paying the Greeks’ pensions, that’s not true – no, we’re paying the German 
banks. It goes a roundabout way, yes, it does a little trip, but the Greeks don’t even get a 
whiff of it. This mechanism cannot last for any length of time – it is not working and will not 
work”. 
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itself regarding these developments, yet it does not broadly communicate them. If 
this information gets widely known, then it will allay the simplistic but rather 
popular myth, foreseeing the country’s destruction upon returning to the the national 
currency the drachma, supposedly due to lack of exchange currency, food, 
medicines, fuels, etc.  
 
In fact, the outcomes of the state budget and balance of payments has been improved 
mainly because of the wide decrease in oil prices, since fuel imports were 
responsible for approximately more than one third of the balance of payments deficit 
up to the end of 2013. In the same year, fuel prices were about 100 euro per barrel, 
whereas in 2015 it has fallen down to 30 euro. While the price of fuel importing was 
decreased by 70% approximately, their final price regarding domestic consumption 
was only down by 30% due to high taxation. Therefore, on one hand, the balance 
deficit was significantly reduced and on the other, public revenues were also higher 
due to a 70% increase of taxation in fuels, which had positive consequences for the 
state budget.  
 
Pie 2. Analytical ESMT estimations about the distribution of the 186,2 billion euro 
loans to Greece 
 
 
 
Source: European School of Management and Technology, Berlin 
 
The improvement of the state budget has also been caused, to a lesser extent, by the 
harsh austerity measures taken through the numerous provisions of the bailout 
agreements and specifically through the memorandum in July 2014, which primarily 
concerns cuts in wages, pensions, social care provisions and state commissions, 
mainly in the healthcare sector. Moreover, it is due to significant delays in paying 
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suppliers and pensioners, even if their respective provisions have vastly decreased. 
Capital controls imposed in June 2015 had a positive role in the amelioration of the 
state budget as well, since they drastically limited imports and facilitated the 
detection of a part of taxable amounts. However, the tremendous increase of direct 
and indirect taxation and the intensification of tax controls and penalties during the 
years 2013-2016, do not seem to have benefited state funds, due to the great 
recession and shrinkage of the economic cycle and total taxable income. 
 
7. The Friendly Grexit as a Realistic Solution 
 
As things stand today and given the present international geopolitical balance, the 
friendly Grexit, temporary or permanent, is the proper alternative for Greece
6
. A 
friendly Grexit is a velvet divorce and does not entail financial and chiefly 
geopolitical risks, which could accompany a unilateral suspension of payments and 
unregulated transition to national currency. As long as it is properly implemented, it 
will supply the necessary liquidity, whose lack utterly destroys Greek economy.  
 
Moreover, it does not cause any serious side effects to the euro zone, while it 
additionally prevents the continuous imposition of extreme austerity policies that 
only lead to spiraling into recession, endless impoverishment and permanent 
economic immobilization, which is also harmful for the lenders. The state budget 
surplus and the harmonization of the balance of payments that have been achieved 
mostly because of the significant decrease in imported fuel price and to lesser extent 
by the enforcement of austerity measures, constitutes a golden opportunity for the 
promotion of this suggested plan.  
 
The friendly Grexit and the coordinated transition to drachma, implies a controlled 
bankruptcy, suspension of debt payments and negotiations for cutting and extending 
its repayment period. During the initial negotiation days, the government must be 
ready to provide liquidity to the economy through the issuing of non-interest state 
                                                          
6 Within the context of the underlying “currency war” between the dollar and the euro, the 
German Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schäuble has publicly argued in favor of a friendly 
Grexit for five years, offering support regarding the conservation of the drachma’s exchange 
rate to the euro and its devaluation of the   national currency by 25% (1 drachma = 0.75 
Euros), which will be particularly beneficial for the competitiveness of Greek economy. In 
order for the exchange rate to be secured and for the new drachma not to be further 
devalued, Schäuble has made a commitment to initially provide to Greece 25 billion euro  
and 25 billion more at a second stage, namely 50 billion euro in total. In such an event, he 
appears willing to discuss a debt haircut and restructure, while in previous statements he has 
referred to the possibility of paying war reparations refer to the WWII compensations that 
Germany owns to Greece because of its occupation by the 3
rd
 Reich, during the period of 
1940-45, which have not been paid up to Greece and still remain due.  
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bonds at a ratio of 1: 1 in relation to the euro. Existing capital controls imposed by 
the euro zone and the recent widespread transactions with electronic   money 
through the banks, could be used properly. By possessing the necessary domestic 
currency liquidity, the Greek government will be in a better negotiation position for 
the friendly Grexit, the necessary cut of the debt and the extension of its repayment 
period.  
 
The next step will be the issuing of the new drachma devaluated at 25% in relation 
to the euro, as a necessary precondition for regaining the lost competitiveness of the 
economy. In order to avoid the dangers of hyperinflation, the amount of new 
drachma produced, must not exceed a certain level of the M2 that is no more than 
20% of the GDP 34-35 billion euro)
7
. The euro may continue to be used as a parallel 
currency for a period decided in accordance with the result of negotiations and 
economic trends.   
 
The widespread fears for an initial vacuum of imported necessary goods do not exist, 
since at present, the total balance of payments for goods and services has shown a 
small surplus. (Bank of Greece, Report of the Director, 2014, page 115). Capital 
controls could contribute to improving the balance of payments, since through them 
it is possible to facilitate exports and reduce imports of non-essential luxury goods.  
 
The black economy and illegal work will be limited necessarily. Only legal 
immigrants could export a certain amount of taxpayer exchange and this alone, will 
prevent the inflow of excess number of economic immigrants without legal 
residence and work permit.  Internal economic transactions may supported by the 
issuing of the national currency.  In the same way, the banks may be re-capitalised 
and provide the desperately needed liquidity to the economy. Low and medium 
incomes may be increased gradually, following labour productivity and GDP growth 
trends.  
 
Government spending restrictions, the combat of corruption, impunity, bureaucracy, 
tax evasion and the strengthening of productive investments, are also necessary. At 
present, in the days of the Modern Greek Tragedy, the country must leave behind the 
obsessions, the hook, and the absurdity of the "euro at all costs" that goes hand in 
hand with the barbaric Memorandum. After learning the lessons from past mistakes, 
the stubborn insistence of being a member of the euro zone deadlock is a fatal 
illusion. Nor is there any solution by the ultra left "all or nothing" obsessions which 
                                                          
7
 The M2 is briefly defined as the   measure of money supply that includes cash and 
checking deposits (M1) as well as near money. “Near money" in M2, includes savings 
deposits, money market mutual funds and other time deposits, which are less liquid and not 
as suitable as exchange mediums but can be quickly converted into cash or checking 
deposits. 
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shift the termination of the Modern Greek Tragedy in infinite future. The friendly 
Grexit must and will come sooner or later.  
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